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I. Introduction 
In 2017, shareholder proposals urging corporate boards to 
report on their climate-related risk made headlines when they 
earned majority support from investors at ExxonMobil, Occidental 
Petroleum, and PPL.1 The key to this historic vote was the support 
of Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, which broke with 
management and cast their votes behind the proposals.2 The 2018 
proxy season saw several more climate-related proposals earn 
majority support, and in 2018 and 2019 record numbers of 
proposals were withdrawn after the companies agreed to respond 
to shareholders’ requests.3 
The highly visible 2017 proposal illustrates a number of key 
aspects of shareholder activism today. The first is the 
mainstreaming of shareholder activism from its origins in the civil 
rights and socially responsible investment movements to a point 
where the largest institutional investors are integrating 
“environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) or “non-financial” 
factors into their voting and investment policies.4 Second, the 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against 
ExxonMobil Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-
rebellion-over-climate-change/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting support of 
over sixty percent of shareholders on the Exxon vote and over sixty-five percent 
at Occidental) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); ExxonMobil 
Corp., Notice of 2017 Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 
13, 2017).  
 2. See Mufson, supra note 1 (discussing the leaders of the shareholder 
activism vote at ExxonMobil).   
 3. See Five Takeaways From the 2019 Proxy Season, ERNST & YOUNG (July 
23, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_us/board-matters/five-takeaways-from-the-
2019-proxy-season (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (explaining key takeaways from 
the 2019 proxy season) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See 
also Andrew Logan, The Hidden Story of Climate Proposals in the 2018 Proxy 
Season, CERES (May 29, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/hidden-
story-climate-proposals-2018-proxy-season (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting 
on responses to shareholder engagement around climate- related risk, transition 
planning, and reporting) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Vanguard’s Responsible Investment Policy, VANGUARD, 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/principles-policies/ (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2019) (outlining how voting and investment policies integrate 
ESG risk assessment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 2019 
Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America, ST. STREET GLOBAL 
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proposal shows how the focus of shareholder activism around ESG 
matters has broadened beyond the civil rights, labor, and human 
rights issues that were its major target throughout much of the 
twentieth century. Climate change risk and corporate 
environmental impacts are now among the top subjects of 
shareholder proposals today.5 Third, as explained below, 
mainstream investors like Blackrock and Vanguard are supporting 
ESG-oriented activism for economic reasons, not only or even 
necessarily because of commitments to a particular ethical or 
political position.6 And finally, this proposal is one of many ESG 
proposals (about 20 percent of all environmental and social 
proposals in 2018) that seek greater corporate transparency about 
non-financial risks and impacts, either to better inform investor 
decision-making or to prompt changes in corporate practice.7 
This Article focuses on the challenge of achieving corporate 
transparency for investment purposes and considers whether 
shareholder activism is the best way to achieve it. Many in the 
                                                                                                     
ADVISORS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/2019-
proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (last visited Sept. 
23, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Proxy Voting 
Guidelines for U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK (Jan. 2019),  
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-
investment-guidelines-us.pdf. Although the term “non-financial” properly refers 
to all information contained in corporate public filings outside of the financial 
statements, it includes, and is often used synonymously with, the term “ESG.” 
See Richard Barker & Robert G. Eccles, Should FASB and IASB Be Responsible 
for Setting Standards for Non-Financial Information?, GREEN PAPER (Oct. 12, 
2018) (using the two terms interchangeably). 
 5. These proposals account for nearly half of all shareholder proposals filed 
in 2019 as of the time of this writing. See Heidi Welsh et al., Proxy Preview 2019, 
HARV. L.S. CORP. GOV. (Apr. 1, 2019) (discussing the “environmental, social, and 
sustainability” shareholder resolutions proposed in early 2019). See also THE 
CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2015– 2018) 32 (2018) 
[hereinafter “PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS”] (reporting that these accounted for 
38.7% of all proposals submitted to a shareholder vote in 2018). 
 6. See infra Part I (explaining evolving understandings of the materiality 
of non-financial ESG information).  
 7. See PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 31, chart 7, 86, chart 24 
(reporting that forty-two proposals in the first half of 2018 addressed either 
corporate reporting on environmental impact or sustainability reporting); 
Virginia Harper Ho & Stephen Kim Park, Non-Financial Reporting in 
Comparative Perspective: Optimizing Private Ordering in Public Disclosure, 41 U. 
PENN. J. INT’L L. __ (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the dual goals of disclosure). 
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business community appear to think so.8 For example, in 2016, 
many corporations and law firms offered comments to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the question of 
whether the agency should develop new ESG-related disclosure 
rules.9 Nearly all took the position that shareholder engagement 
and other forms of shareholder activism were the best way to 
improve ESG disclosure and that the SEC should leave well 
enough alone.10  
The SEC appears to agree. Several SEC commissioners have 
spoken openly about their opposition to new ESG disclosure 
reform,11 and no such reforms have yet been proposed by the SEC. 
As a result, investors must rely on shareholder proposals like the 
ones submitted to ExxonMobil and its peers in order to obtain 
information that goes beyond what companies voluntarily disclose 
in their corporate sustainability reports or, to a limited extent, in 
                                                                                                     
 8. Leading business organizations and trade associations say they prefer 
private solutions over new disclosure regulation; however, many of these same 
business groups are also pressing for restrictions on the tools of shareholder 
activism. See Welsh et al., supra note 5 (discussing the Main Street Investors 
Coalition and the National Association of Manufacturing’s efforts to limit 
shareholders’ ability to file proposals). This conclusion is based on the author’s 
own review of all of the unique comments submitted to the SEC in connection 
with its 2016 Regulation S-K Concept Release, which are available at 
www.sec.gov. 
 9. See William Thomas & Annise Maguire, SEC Studying Change of 
Regulation S-K to Require ESG Disclosures, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 
(Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2016/11/SEC_Studying_Cha
nge_of_Regulation_SK_to_Require_ESG_Disclosures.pdf (discussing possible 
SEC changes). 
 10. See Comment of Shearman & Sterling LLP on Regulation S-K Concept 
Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf (Certain areas of reform, 
most notably in the . . . ESG space, are better addressed by ongoing engagement 
with . . . investors, rather than through SEC mandates.”). See also infra Part 
III.B.3 (explaining the sources of opposition to non-financial reporting reform). 
 11. See Hester M. Pierce, Remarks Before the Council of Institutional 
Investors, HARV. L. S. CORP. GOV. (Mar. 6, 2019) (rejecting calls to introduce ESG 
disclosure rules or to endorse ESG disclosure standards developed by private 
organizations); Jay Clayton, Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarks-
investor-advisory-committee-meeting-121318 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (same) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  As this Article goes to press, 
the SEC is considering limited ESG disclosure proposals, but their ultimate 
success and form is unclear. 
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their public filings. In contrast, many investors, governments, and 
international organizations now urge the need for non-financial 
reporting reforms that will help investors understand the financial 
impact of corporate environmental and social performance.12 
I argue that although shareholder activism is a powerful tool 
to change corporate practice, it is an inefficient substitute for 
non-financial disclosure reform under the federal securities 
laws — in fact, it has impeded it. Rule 14a-8 of the federal proxy 
rules, which establishes the process and conditions for 
shareholders to submit proposals to a shareholder vote, restricts 
shareholders’ ability to push for better corporate disclosure and 
also forces shareholders to frame their proposals in a way that 
causes companies to discount the materiality of ESG 
information.13 In particular, the interpretation of Rule 14a-8’s 
“ordinary business exception,” together with the rule’s long use in 
shareholder activism around “public policy and social issues,” are 
now discouraging support for new rulemaking that could improve 
investor and market access to material ESG information. 
This Article begins by explaining the major shift in 
understandings of ESG materiality among investors that is driving 
their growing demand for ESG information and their support for 
many ESG-related shareholder proposals. It also explains why this 
demand for ESG information is not already met by the wealth of 
publicly available ESG information. Part III then examines the 
text and interpretations of Rule 14a-8’s “ordinary business 
exception” and explains how the history of its application to 
environmental and social proposals has created barriers to 
potentially more effective disclosure reforms. This Article 
concludes by arguing for new interpretive guidance by the SEC 
that would recognize the potential materiality of ESG information 
and realign with the earliest of the SEC’s own articulations of the 
ordinary business exception. These interpretations make clear 
that proposals may raise issues that are appropriate for a 
shareholder vote not only because of their “public policy” or “social” 
implications, but also because they implicate important and 
potentially material financial considerations. 
                                                                                                     
 12. See infra Part II (identifying some of these initiatives). 
 13. See infra Part III (explaining the history and application of Rule 14a-8). 
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II. Beyond Public Policy: Non-Financial Materiality and Demand 
for Disclosure Reform 
Until relatively recently, investor demand for information on 
companies’ environmental or workforce-related factors came 
largely from ethical, “social,” or “responsible” investors, and the 
level of such investment as a percentage of the total assets under 
management (AUM) in the United States was relatively small.14 
Shareholder activists have therefore divided into several camps. In 
the first camp are “financial” investors, primarily hedge funds, who 
have tended to push for changes on corporate boards and, in the 
view of some, short-term profit.15 Another camp consists of public 
pension funds, labor unions, religious orders, and individual 
“gadflies,” whose activism has often aligned with particular values 
and interests.16 In the middle, mainstream institutional investors 
like Vanguard and Fidelity have generally voted with management 
against environmental or social shareholder proposals, so while 
support for these proposals has grown over time, it remains 
relatively low.17 Similarly, most investors did not historically 
                                                                                                     
 14. See SIF FOUNDATION REPORT ON U.S. SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE, AND 
IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS: 2018 — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2018), US SIF, 
https://www.ussif.org/trends (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting that in 1995, 
only USD $639 billion were invested using responsible investment strategies, as 
compared to over USD $10 trillion in 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 15. On the role of hedge funds as catalysts of shareholder activism, see 
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (describing hedge funds as “activist arbitrageurs”). See 
also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 681–88 (2010) (highlighting investor 
short-termism as a contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis).  In the past 
five years, hedge funds have been responsible for between two and four percent 
of all shareholder proposals. PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 30, chart 
6. 
 16. See PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 30, chart 6 (reporting that 
labor unions, pension funds, nonprofit organizations, and individuals remain 
important sponsors of most shareholder proposals). 
 17. In general, ESG proposals, including those seeking greater corporate 
transparency, fail to achieve majority support; average levels of support reached 
only 25.7% in 2018, with less than seven percent receiving majority support. 
PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 16, 66, chart 21. In comparison, 
governance-related proposals achieved an average 37.5% support in 2018. Id. at 
18. An indication of mainstream investors’ historical lack of support for 
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incorporate non-financial information into investment analysis, 
and “responsible” investment strategies were largely focused on 
ethical or social screening strategies that excluded certain firms or 
sectors from investment portfolios.18  
Over the past decade or so, a striking shift has occurred in how 
investors, governments, and many companies think about ESG 
materiality, which has driven higher demand for investment-grade 
ESG information among investors. The 2017 ExxonMobil proposal 
itself illustrates this point:  
Item 12–Report on Impacts of Climate Change Policies: 
RESOLVED: Shareholders request that, beginning in 
2018, ExxonMobil publish an annual assessment of the 
long-term portfolio impacts of technological advances and 
global climate change policies, at reasonable cost and 
omitting proprietary information. The assessment can be 
incorporated into existing reporting and should analyze 
the impacts on ExxonMobil’s oil and gas reserves and 
resources under a scenario in which reduction in demand 
results from carbon restrictions and related rules or 
commitments adopted by governments consistent with 
the globally agreed upon 2 degree target [established by 
the Paris Climate Accord]. This reporting should assess 
the resilience of the company’s full portfolio of reserves 
                                                                                                     
environmental and workforce-related proposals is Vanguard’s 2016 Voting 
Guidelines, which state as follows:   
The Board generally believes that these are “ordinary business 
matters” that are primarily the responsibility of management and 
should be evaluated and approved solely by the corporation’s board of 
directors. Often, proposals may address concerns with which the Board 
philosophically agrees, but absent a compelling economic impact on 
shareholder value (e.g., proposals to require expensing of stock 
options), the funds will typically abstain from voting on these 
proposals. 
Vanguard Voting Guidelines (2016), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/5-Vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines-_-
Vanguard.pdf. 
 18. See Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible Investment and Shareholder 
Activism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 
251, 262–65 (Andrew Crane et al., eds. 2008) (describing screening and relative 
weighting investment strategies and observing that responsible investment 
includes not only “value-based” or ethical investors, but also “value-seeking” and 
“value-enhancing” investors who see ESG strategies as enhancing economic 
value). 
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and resources through 2040 and beyond, and address the 
financial risks associated with such a scenario.19 
Similarly, Blackrock’s public statement explaining its 2017 
vote frames the reasons for seeking information on climate-related 
risk in economic terms. It states: “[w]e will continue our dialogue 
over time with Exxon and other companies on a range of issues of 
economic relevance, including but not limited to climate-related 
risks, and regardless of whether the companies have received a 
shareholder proposal.”20 Essentially, investors have identified 
climate-related risk and other ESG factors as important to their 
investment and voting decisions—in other words, within the 
definition of materiality that has been established by the Supreme 
Court under the federal securities laws.21 
Survey evidence confirms that the vast majority of 
institutional investors now believe that companies should disclose 
material ESG information to investors, but that critical ESG 
information gaps exist.22 In addition, investors with over $70 
                                                                                                     
 19. EXXONMOBIL, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
 20. BlackRock Vote Bulletin, BLACKROCK (May 2017), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/press-release/blk-vote-bulletin-
exxon-may-2017.pdf (explaining BlackRock’s vote in favor of the ExxonMobil 
climate change shareholder proposal) (emphasis added).  
 21. Under the standard set by the Supreme Court in TSC v. Northway, 426 
U.S. 438, 449 (1976), information is material if there “is a substantial likelihood 
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote” or “that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information” 
available to the investor in reaching a voting or investment decision. 
 22. See Kiran Vasantham et al., Institutional Investor Survey 2019 15–16 
(2019), https://www.morrowsodali.com/uploads/insights/attachments/ae189c 
6414e1ef6b0eed5b7372ecb385.pdf (finding that eighty percent support the 
integration of non-financial disclosure with existing mandatory disclosures and 
that a similar percentage support more extensive ESG disclosure). See also PWC, 
SUSTAINABILITY GOES MAINSTREAM: INSIGHTS INTO INVESTOR VIEWS 6–9 (2014), 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resource-institute/publications/assets/pwc-
sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf (finding that approximately 
eighty percent of surveyed investors, accounting for over fifty percent of U.S. 
institutional assets, integrate sustainability information into investment analysis 
but that an equal percentage were dissatisfied with its comparability); 
Tomorrow’s Investment Rules 2.0, ERNST & YOUNG (2015), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/investor_survey/ 
$FILE/CCaSS_Institutional_InvestorSurvey2015.pdf (discussing how investors 
are looking for more nonfinancial reporting); Is Your Non-Financial Performance 
Revealing the True Value of Your Business to Investors?, ERNST & YOUNG (2017), 
http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/assurance/climate-change-and-sustainability-
FROM PUBLIC POLICY TO MATERIALITY 1239 
trillion in assets under management have now voluntarily 
committed to integrate ESG information into their investment 
decisions.23 More than $12 trillion AUM in the U.S. is now 
managed by investors who engage in ESG-related shareholder 
activism, invest in “sustainable, responsible, and impact” 
(SRI)-invested funds, or incorporate ESG criteria into investment 
analysis.24 This figure represents a thirty-eight percent increase 
since 2016 and over one-fourth of all assets under management in 
the U.S.25  
Indeed, many governments, stock exchanges, and 
international organizations have already acknowledged the 
materiality of ESG information. For example, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) 2019 Statement 
on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuers states that “ESG 
matters . . . may have a material short-term and long-term impact 
on the business operations of the issuers [and] on risks and returns 
for investors and their investment and voting decisions.”26 The 
London Stock Exchange’s ESG reporting guidance also observes 
that ESG-related information “has moved from a ‘peripheral’ to a 
‘core’ part of investment analysis, across all sectors.”27 Even the 
U.S. Department of Labor has acknowledged that 
“[e]nvironmental, social, and governance issues may have a direct 
relationship to the economic value of the plan’s investment, 
[making them] proper components of the [pension fund] fiduciary’s 
primary analysis of the economic merits of competing investment 
choices.”28 Outside the U.S., consideration of ESG factors in 
                                                                                                     
services/ey-non-financial-performance-may-influence-investors (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2019) (finding that forty percent of surveyed investors were dissatisfied 
with the quality of non-financial disclosure) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 23. See Annual Report 2018, at 6, UNPRI (2019), 
https://www.unpri.org/annual-report-2018 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (reporting 
that current signatories represent over $90 trillion in assets under management) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 24. USSIF, supra note 14, at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 2019 Statement on Disclosure of ESG Matters by Issuer, IOSCO (2019), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf.  
 27. Your Guide to ESG Reporting, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP (2017), 
https://www.lseg.com/esg (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 28. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA 
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shareholder engagement and throughout the investment chain is 
mandatory for institutional investors in Europe under the 2017 
amendments to its Shareholder Rights Directive.29 In sum, 
investors are now as likely to assess a portfolio company’s 
environmental or social practices because of their financial 
materiality as they are to do so for ethical or public policy reasons. 
However, as I have discussed in other work, the level of ESG 
disclosure contained in corporate annual reports and other public 
filings, on the one hand, and the quality of voluntary sustainability 
reporting, on the other, are not sufficient to meet rising demand 
for investment-grade information.30 Public filings largely depend 
on issuer judgments on the materiality of ESG information to 
investors, which can lead to under-reporting.31 Although over 
eighty percent of public companies now produce voluntary 
sustainability reports, these are not based on consistent reporting 
frameworks and do not align with the materiality standards of 
federal securities law.32 They also lack the reliability and 
comparability that investment analysis requires.33  
                                                                                                     
in Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,136 
(Oct. 26, 2015), codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509.2015-0 I (2015) (emphasis added). 
 29. Directive (EU) 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 17 May 2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards to the Encouragement 
of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement, 2015 O.J. (L 132), 1, 1–25, 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/828/oj. 
 30. See Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Disclosure and The Costs of 
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 446–52 (2018) (discussing nonfinancial 
disclosure). 
 31. See The State of Disclosure 2016: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of 
Sustainability Disclosure in SEC Filings, SASB (2016), at 5–8, 
https://library.sasb.org/state-of-disclosure-annual-report-2/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2019) (analyzing disclosure limitations in over 700 filings, including 597 10-K 
filers and 116 20-F filers, across 434 disclosure topics) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32. See IRRC INSTITUTE AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTS INSTITUTE (SI2), 
STATE OF INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 27–32 (2018) (analyzing 
sustainability reporting trends in the United States). 
 33. See Harper Ho, supra note 30, at 428–30 (discussing these limits); 
Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 
35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 93 (2014) (“[M]arket competition and CSR 
commitments do not provide sufficient incentives to firms to voluntarily 
disclose thereby leading to the systemic underreporting of useful information 
regarding the social impacts of business activities.”).  
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In its review of this reporting landscape, the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) of the G20’s 
Financial Stability Board therefore concluded that available 
sources of climate-related non-financial information leave critical 
gaps, making assessments of the financial impacts of non-financial 
risk difficult for investors and governments alike.34 Similarly, 
when the SEC last sought comment on investor views, eighty 
percent supported revisions to how ESG issues are disclosed in the 
annual reports, including the SEC’s Investor Advisory 
Committee.35 The observed deficiencies of current non-financial 
reporting have prompted several investor petitions for new 
rulemaking to the SEC,36 as well as renewed efforts by 
shareholders to obtain non-financial information and encourage 
better voluntary reporting practices through shareholder activism. 
III. Shareholder Activism and Non-Financial Reporting 
In response to rising investor demand for ESG information, 
leading business organizations, such as the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, have maintained that voluntary disclosure by 
companies is sufficient, and that shareholder activism is the best 
way to promote better corporate reporting practice if it is in fact 
                                                                                                     
 34. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, FINAL 
REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURES, at iii, 1 (2017). 
 35. SASB, supra note 31, at 4; Comment of SEC Investor Advisory 
Committee on Regulation S-K Concept Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n (June 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-
16/s70616-22.pdf. Symposium keynote speaker Lisa Fairfax serves on the board 
of the IAC. 
 36. See Cynthia Williams & Jill Fisch, Request for rulemaking petition on 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018), No. 4-730, 
https:/www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf (explaining a request for 
the SEC to engage in notice and comment rule-making to develop a better 
framework for companies’  long-term risks and performance). See also Human 
Capital Management Rulemaking petition to require issuers to disclose 
iformation about their human capital management policies, practices, and 
performance (July 6, 2017), No. 4-711, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf (requesting “that the 
Commission adopt new rules, or amend existing rules, to require issuers to 
disclosure information about their human capital management policies, practices 
and performance.”).  
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necessary.37 They therefore oppose new disclosure rules that could 
expand reporting obligations for listed firms. Indeed, prior SEC 
disclosure-related rulemaking that was intended to drive greater 
corporate accountability for human rights practices has been met 
with stiff opposition from the business community and the courts, 
even when done at Congress’ direction.38 
This Symposium highlights the powerful contributions 
shareholder activism has made to the civil rights movement. 
Shareholder activism also led the battle against apartheid in 
South Africa and has brought about more recent changes to 
corporate governance norms and practice. However, confidence in 
shareholder activism as an adequate substitute for disclosure 
reform is nonetheless misplaced. First, the mechanisms of 
shareholder activism are unwieldy if the goal is to advance the core 
purposes of the mandatory reporting regime that has been 
developed under federal securities law. Second, the history and 
success of Rule 14a-8 have in fact undermined support for more 
effective regulatory solutions from Congress, the SEC, or stock 
exchanges. This Part explains these obstacles, drawing on the 
history of Rule 14a-8 and its interpretation over time by the SEC 
and the courts.  
A. The Practical Limits of Shareholder Activism 
At the outset, shareholder engagement is a costly, impractical, 
and inefficient tool for achieving the goals of the federal disclosure 
regime: to protect investors from fraud; to promote “fair, efficient, 
and transparent markets;” and to reduce systemic risk to the 
economy as a whole.39 Most obviously, shareholder proposals are 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Corporate Sustainability Reporting: Past, Present, Future, U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COM. FOUND. (Nov. 2018), at 8, 
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Corporate%20Sustaina
bility%20Reporting%20Past%20Present%20Future.pdf (summarizing the 
Chamber of Commerce’s opinion on self-reporting). 
 38. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(challenging conflict mineral disclosure rules). 
 39. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SEC. REG. 3, IOSCO (2017), 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf. See also Business 
and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K: Concept Release, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 23,916, 23,921 (Apr. 22, 2016) (articulating similar goals as the core of the 
SEC’s mission). 
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by law advisory, and the board is free to disregard even a majority 
vote.40 Shareholder proposals also target only a relative handful of 
public companies each year, mostly large-capitalization companies 
in the S&P 500.41 For example, between 2015 and 2018, only forty 
to sixty proposals on environmental or sustainability reporting 
went to a vote each year at Russell 3000 companies.42 Although 
successful shareholder proposals at firms that are highly visible 
industry leaders often have spillover effects on other firms, the ad 
hoc, campaign-like nature of shareholder activism is better suited 
to raising companies’ awareness of investor concerns, not to 
standardizing how companies report on non-financial risks and 
impacts associated with their business. Finally, a growing number 
of environmental and social proposals do succeed in getting a 
response from management before a vote occurs,43 but those that 
go to a vote routinely garner relatively low levels of shareholder 
support and are therefore even easier for boards to ignore.44  
Most critically, the purpose of the proxy rules under Section 
14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) is 
to promote shareholder democracy as a check on corporate 
management, and to prevent fraud.45 High shareholder support for 
                                                                                                     
 40. See 17 C.F.R. §  240.14a-8(i)(1) (permitting exclusion of proposals that 
would be improper under state law); Adoption of Amendments Relating to 
Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 
52,994, 52,998 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Release] (“[P]roposals that merely 
recommend or request that the board take certain action [are] not contrary to the 
typical state statute, since such proposals are merely advisory in nature and 
would not be binding on the board even if adopted by a majority.”). 
 41. PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS, supra note 5, at 26. 
 42. Id. at 86, chart 24. 
 43. See id. at 15 (finding that the rate of withdrawn proposals doubled in 
2018 over 2017).  Withdrawal of a proposal by the proponent often indicates that 
a successful response was obtained without the need for a formal vote. See Paula 
Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing Social Change Through Shareholder 
Proposals, 91 ECON. REV.: FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA, Aug. 2006, at 1, 13 (2006) 
(“[W]ithdrawal can be viewed as indicating some level of success.”); Rob Bauer et 
al., Who Withdraws Shareholder Proposals and Does It Matter? An Analysis of 
Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 CORP. GOV.: INT’L REV. 472, 474 (2015) (“[I]f 
negotiations are successful, the proposal is withdrawn.”).  
 44. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing historical average 
levels of shareholder support for environmental and social proposals).  
 45. See Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 421–22 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (reviewing the purpose of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act). See 
also 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 52,995 (emphasizing the rule’s goal to 
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a proposal may signal that the topic is indeed material to investors, 
but that is not a prerequisite for the proposal to be in included in 
the corporate proxy. As the legislative history of Rule 14a-8 
discussed below makes clear, shareholder activism is intended as 
a megaphone for investors, not primarily as a conduit of 
information to the market.46 Rule 14a-8 is therefore designed to 
address much broader goals than those that drive the federal 
disclosure regime, but it is for the same reason not well-suited to 
fixing the core problems of comparability and standardization that 
currently plague voluntary ESG reporting. 
B. The Ordinary Business Exception and Anti-Materiality 
Beyond the practical limits of Rule 14a-8, the SEC’s 
interpretation of the rule itself and the very success of social 
activists in the past have perhaps ironically become barriers to any 
future rule-making that could help standardize how material ESG 
information is disclosed. This is problematic, because corporate 
transparency around material ESG factors is essential to both 
market efficiency and corporations’ accountability to their 
shareholders, as well as other stakeholders. In addition, as I have 
argued elsewhere, disclosure reform is a more efficient solution to 
the under-reporting of material ESG information.47 The core issue 
concerns one of the provisions of Rule 14a-8 known as the “ordinary 
business exception,” which has a direct effect on whether many 
shareholder proposals go to a vote. This Part introduces the history 
of this provision and explains how its scope and implementation 
have affected how companies view the materiality of ESG issues.  
                                                                                                     
advance shareholder democracy). 
 46. See Roosevelt, 958 F.2d. at 421–22 (“Congress did not narrowly train 
section 14(a) on the interest of stockholders in receiving information necessary to 
the intelligent exercise of their [voting] rights under state law” but to “give true 
vitality to the concept of corporate democracy.”). Indeed, Regulation FD (for “fair 
disclosure”) restricts the disclosure of material non-public information that is not 
simultaneously disclosed to the public. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (1939).  
 47. See generally Harper Ho, supra note 30. 
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1. The Purpose and History of Rule 14a-8 and the Ordinary 
Business Exception 
Shareholders’ ability to exercise voice in corporate governance 
rests largely on their ability to submit shareholder proposals to the 
corporation for inclusion in the corporate proxy under Rule 14a-8.48 
Although the proxy rules were introduced in 1935,49 the SEC did 
not adopt a rule requiring shareholder proposals to be included in 
the corporate proxy until 1942.50 The legislative history of Rule 
14a-8 indicates that its purpose was to facilitate shareholder 
participation in corporate governance and to serve as a check on 
potential managerial abuse in the proxy solicitation process.51  
Rule 14a-8 now allows corporations to exclude a proposal from 
the corporate proxy if it fails to comply with the procedural rules 
of Rule 14a-8 or if there is a substantive basis for exclusion under 
Rule 14a-8(i).52 If a company is uncertain about whether it can rely 
on an exclusion, it can petition the SEC for “no-action” review of 
the issue or seek a court’s determination of the issue.53 The 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Bauer et al., supra note 43, at 474–76 (discussing how shareholder 
proposals can initiate direct engagement or follow an unsuccessful engagement). 
 49. See generally Exchange Act Release No. 378 (Sept. 24, 1935). 
 50. See Exchange Act Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) [hereinafter “1942 
Release”] (adopting the rule that initially became Rule 14a-7). See also LISA 
FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND 
PARTICIPATION 65 (2011) (discussing this history); Kevin W. Waite, The Ordinary 
Business Operations Exception to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return to 
Predictability, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1995) (same).  
 51. See Waite, supra note 50, at 1260 n.42–44 (citing this legislative history).  
Rule 14a-8 was originally adopted as Rule 14a-7.  
 52. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (listing reasons a company may exclude a 
shareholder proposal).  
 53. The SEC issues interpretations and guidance relating to these 
exceptions, but companies may also petition the SEC for “no-action relief” by 
stating the exception on which they tend to rely and seeking an opinion from SEC 
staff that it will take “no action” to enforce Rule 14a-8 against the company if it 
excludes the proposal from its corporate proxy. SEC no-action letters are 
non- binding. See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 884–86 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing the degree of 
deference courts afford to no-action letters given their non-binding nature). 
Alternatively, shareholders and companies may litigate the question of whether 
a proposal is excludable or not, and courts may take positions that differ from 
those of the SEC staff.  See, e.g., infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing 
Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,792 F.3d 323 (2015), which parted 
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substantive grounds for excluding proposals from the corporate 
proxy found in modern Rule 14a-8(i) did not exist in the initial 
version of the shareholder proposal rule, though it did contain 
some procedural conditions.54 Prior to 1976, the rule simply 
required companies to include any proposal that was “a proper 
subject for action by the security holders.”55 From 1942 to 1976, 
the SEC determined what was a “proper subject” of a shareholder 
proposal with reference to state corporate law.56 However, because 
state law generally provides only that “the business and affairs of 
the corporation shall be managed by the board of directors” 57 and 
because state courts offered little guidance on what might be a 
“proper purpose” for shareholder consideration, SEC staff began to 
develop their own interpretative guidance.58  
Perhaps the most important of these substantive bases for 
exclusion is the “ordinary business exception,”59 which allows the 
company to exclude a shareholder proposal from the corporate 
proxy if “the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's 
ordinary business operations.”60 This provision, which was first 
introduced in 1954,61 is one of the most widely used grounds for 
exclusion and is among the most heavily litigated of the Rule 14a-8 
exceptions.62  
                                                                                                     
course from the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(7)). 
 54. See FAIRFAX, supra note 50, at 65–66 (discussing this history).  
 55. 1942 Release, supra note 50.  
 56. Waite, supra note 50, at 1261 n.51 (citations omitted).  
 57. See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 141(a) (2018).  
 58. See Apache Corp. v. NYCERS, 621 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 n.4 (2009) 
(observing the lack of state law guidance on this question). 
 59. In 2018, the ordinary business exception was one of the most common 
grounds for exclusion that companies raised in their requests for no-action review 
(thirty-three percent of all no-action requests); around sixty percent succeeded, 
down from nearly seventy-five percent in 2017. See Ron Mueller et al., 
Shareholder Developments in the 2018 Proxy Season, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER 
LLP (July 12, 2018), at 11, https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/shareholder-proposal-developments-during-the-2018-
proxy-season.pdf (discussing statistics on the usage of the ordinary business 
exception in 2018).  
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-18(i)(7).  
 61. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 
4979 (Jan. 6, 1954) [hereinafter “1954 Release”] (discussing the introduction of 
the ordinary business exception).  
 62. See FAIRFAX, supra note 50, at 72 (discussing in detail the ordinary 
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As the SEC explained in its 1998 interpretative release (“1998 
Release”), the ordinary business exception rests on two underlying 
policy goals. The first is “to confine the resolution of ordinary 
business problems to management and the board of directors, since 
it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such 
problems at an annual shareholders meeting.”63 As a result, the 
SEC considers whether the “subject matter of the proposal 
[concerns] tasks [that] are so fundamental to management’s ability 
to run a company . . . that they could not . . . be subject to direct 
shareholder oversight.”64 For example, proposals involving “the 
management of the workforce, such as the hiring, promotion, and 
termination of employees,” generally relate to ordinary business 
matters and are therefore excludable.65 Second, the proposal 
cannot “micro-manage” by engaging with complex matters on 
which shareholders collectively “would not be in a position to make 
an informed judgment.”66 
Because most shareholder proposals and the vast majority of 
those dealing with environmental or social concerns necessarily 
relate to some aspect of the company’s operations,67 the ordinary 
business exception is also one of the most important substantive 
bases for the exclusion of environmental and social proposals.68 
Table 1 gives an indication of how often common environmental 
and social topics have been raised in shareholder proposals that 
have been challenged by the company under the ordinary business 
                                                                                                     
business exception). 
 63. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter 
“1998 Release”].  See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J (Oct. 23, 2018) (discussing 
the rule’s origin and intent); SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I (Nov. 1, 2017) (same).  
 64. 1998 Release, supra note 63. 
 65. Id. See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J, supra note 63 (citing Staff Legal 
Bulletin No. 14A (Jul. 12, 2002)).  
 66. 1998 Release, supra note 63 (citing 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 
52,997). 
 67. The SEC and the courts have both observed that most proposals can be 
swept into the ordinary business exception, absent the SEC’s broader interpretive 
gloss. See 1976 Release, supra note 40, at 52,997 (announcing the “significant 
policy” exception to address this). See also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(referencing the 1976 Release).  
 68. See supra note 59 (explaining in detail the usage of the ordinary business 
exception).   
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exception over the past 20 years.69 Because corporations rely 
heavily on the ordinary business exception when considering ESG 
proposals, companies’ experiences with ESG-related activism has 
largely defined their views of these issues. 
2. “Transcending” the Ordinary Business of the Company is 
Equated with “Policy” or “Social” Issues 
Since 1976, the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary business 
exception has expanded shareholders’ ability to bring proposals to 
a vote by allowing them to speak to the “ordinary business” of a 
company so long as the subject of the proposal also implicates a 
“significant policy issue.” As I explain in Part IV, the provenance 
                                                                                                     
 69. Table 1 does not fully capture all aspects of shareholder engagement with 
companies around environmental and social issues, nor does it capture proposals 
that are withdrawn or are automatically included in the corporate proxy. 
Proposals relating to “risk” are not shown but were approximately double the level 
of proposals for “risk management” over this period. These results are based on a 
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of the SEC’s 1976 interpretive release (“1976 Release”)70 clearly 
indicates an intention that this exception encompass matters that 
are financially significant as well. However, the more common 
formulation defines “significant” in terms of “social or policy” 
issues, and this history now presents a significant obstacle to 
non-financial reporting reform because it appears that shareholder 
proposals advance issues that are not material. As explained 
above, investors advocating for non-financial reporting reform 
routinely assert that certain ESG matters are financially material 
to the firm and its investors, making better corporate reporting 
essential.71 However, if the same investors seek improved 
disclosure via a shareholder proposal, they must raise their 
petition in the very different language of politics, shareholder 
democracy, and social movements. 
Concerned that proposals “which have significant policy, 
economic, or other implications inherent in them” were being 
excluded under the ordinary business exception and undermining 
shareholder democracy, the 1976 Release adopted a new 
framework for determining whether a proposal should be excluded 
under the “ordinary business exception.”72 The SEC concluded that 
a company may only exclude proposals “relating to the conduct of 
the ordinary business of the issuer” that “are mundane in nature 
and do not involve any substantial policy or other 
considerations.”73 In essence, the SEC created an exception for 
proposals raising important policy issues. As the SEC elaborated 
in the 1998 Release, proposals relating to the “ordinary business” 
of the company may be excluded unless the proposal “focuses on 
policy issues that are sufficiently significant because they 
transcend ordinary business and would be appropriate for a 
                                                                                                     
 70. See supra note 40 (explaining 1976 Release).    
 71. For ESG matters that may not be material to a given firm, disclosure 
reform that is intended to change corporate conduct rather than simply elicit 
better information may also be within the SEC’s authority to regulate in the 
public interest or to address sources of systemic risk. See Harper Ho, supra note 
30, at 440, 445–46 (presenting these arguments).   
 72. 1976 Release, supra note 40.  
 73. Id. at 52,998. The 1998 Release defines the scope of ordinary business to 
mean proposals “so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a 
day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct 
shareholder oversight.” 1998 Release, supra note 63. 
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shareholder vote.”74 In 1998, the SEC also clarified its current 
two-part approach, adding that proposals raising a “sufficiently 
significant” issue can only be excluded if they “see[k] to 
micro-manage the company.”75 
Of course, interpreting which issues are both of relevance to 
the company and yet “sufficiently significant” to transcend 
“ordinary business” is a highly subjective and therefore difficult 
task for the SEC and the courts.76 The SEC has at times identified 
certain issues as “significant” in its interpretive guidance. For 
example, in 2009, the SEC relaxed its interpretation of Rule 
14a-8(i)(7) in the wake of the financial crisis to state that “the 
board’s role in the oversight of a company’s management of risk is 
a significant policy matter.”77 On rare occasions, it has attempted 
to set bright-line rules for which proposals are not significant 
enough.78 Since 2017, the SEC has also required corporations 
relying on this exception to discuss in their no-action request the 
                                                                                                     
 74. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I, supra note 63 (citing 1998 Release, supra 
note 63). The 1998 Release stated disjunctively the requirement that the proposal 
“transcend” ordinary business and raise a “significant policy or other issue.” Id. 
This prompted the Third Circuit to adopt a bifurcated test in Trinity Wall Street 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 729 F.3d 323 (3rd Cir. 2015), in which the court stated 
that for a proposal to avoid exclusion, “a shareholder must do more than focus its 
proposal on a significant policy issue; the subject matter of its proposal must 
‘transcend’ the company’s ordinary business.” In 2015, the SEC rejected this 
interpretation and expressed concern that distinguishing the two concepts would 
“lead to the unwarranted exclusion of shareholder proposals.” SEC Staff Leg. 
Bulletin 14H (Oct. 22, 2015). Instead, it reaffirmed its own position that proposals 
that raise a significant policy issue will therefore “transcend a company’s ordinary 
business.” Id. 
 75. 1998 Release, supra note 63; Apache Corp. v. NYCERS, 621 F. Supp. 2d 
444, 451 (2009). 
 76. It is important to note that shareholder proposals cannot raise issues 
wholly unconnected with the company; there must be a “sufficient 
nexus . . . between the nature of the proposal and the company” in order for the 
significant policy exception to apply. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 
2009). See also SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14H at n. 32 (Oct. 23, 2015) (same). 
 77. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009).   
 78. In general, the SEC rejects bright-line tests for the “significance” of a 
given issue. However, in 1992, the SEC’s Cracker Barrel No-Action letter adopted 
a bright-line test that would consider all employment-related proposals 
excludable, other than those involving executives. Cracker Barrel Old Country 
Store, SEC No-Action Letter (Oct. 13, 1992), aff’d by Commission, Cracker Barrel 
Old Country Store, Inc. (Jan. 15, 1993). In its 1998 Release, the SEC abandoned 
this bright-line test in favor of a case-by-case approach to employment matters. 
1998 Release, supra note 63.  
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board’s assessment of whether the matter is in fact “sufficiently 
significant.”79 Regardless, the SEC’s most common formulation of 
this exception omits any mention of economic importance to the 
company or its shareholders, which is a touchstone of materiality 
under the federal securities laws. Instead, it requires that 
shareholders seeking to prevent proposals related to corporate 
operations from being excluded must frame them as raising a 
“significant policy issue.” 
This common short-hand entrenches the view that 
environmental and social risks and other factors are not 
economically material to the firm and its investors, but are instead 
a smokescreen for the social or political agendas of niche investors 
and related interest groups. Companies opposed to such proposals 
are therefore even more likely to view them as immaterial and as 
an inappropriate subject of future disclosure reform. As the 
International Integrated Reporting Council has noted, “the use of 
terminology such as ‘sustainability or public policy 
issues . . . marginalizes such information and impedes its effective 
integration into the core investor document.”80  
At the same time, the second part of the two-part test—the 
prohibition on “micro-management”—also prevents shareholder 
proposals from being an effective alternative to ESG disclosure 
reform. First, the more prescriptive a proposal, the more likely it 
is to be found to “micromanage” the company’s approach to its 
workforce, environmental concerns, or how it manages its existing 
public reporting obligations. However, the problems with the 
current state of ESG disclosure are not a lack of information that 
could be resolved by broad requests for sustainability reporting, for 
example, but a lack of standardization, which requires consistency 
across disclosing companies and greater particularity in the 
content and form of disclosure.   
A proposal will be considered micromanagement if it “involves 
intricate detail, or seeks to impose specific time-frames or methods 
for implementing complex policies.”81 Although the SEC adopts a 
                                                                                                     
 79. SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14I, supra note 63. 
 80. Comment of International Integrated Reporting Council on Regulation 
S-K Concept Release to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 
31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-197.pdf.  
 81. See SEC Staff Leg. Bulletin 14J (Oct. 2, 2018) (citing 1998 Release, supra 
note 63, and Apple, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 5, 2016 (finding excludable 
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presumption of inclusion, proposals urging the company to use 
certain performance indicators or adopt particular reporting 
standards may therefore raise micro-management concerns. For 
example, in 2018, the SEC, in a surprising departure from past 
practice, concluded that a resolution asking EOG Resources to 
adopt greenhouse gas emission goals sought to micromanage the 
company and could therefore be excluded.82 In addition, the 
general requirement that shareholder proposals be non-binding on 
the board in deference to the board’s role under state corporate law 
also means that the more prescriptive a proposal, the more likely 
it is to be excluded from the corporate proxy under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). 
For these reasons, shareholder proposals are a poor substitute for 
the adoption of ESG disclosure rules and principles that would 
apply to all companies’ public filings.  
Finally, corporate issuers’ perceptions of the economic 
importance of ESG issues have been diminished by the 
“democracy” in shareholder democracy. This Symposium has 
highlighted the tremendous role shareholder activism has played 
in the civil rights movement and beyond. However, the fact that 
the typical proponent of such proposals has historically been an 
individual, responsible investment fund, labor union, or religious 
order has reinforced corporations’ fears of expansive and politically 
motivated regulation when it comes to disclosure reform. 
3. Rejection of ESG Materiality and Opposition to Non-Financial 
Disclosure Reform 
Since the SEC has directed shareholders to frame proposals 
related to corporate operations or their impact in terms of “social” 
or “policy” issues for over forty years, it is perhaps not surprising 
that many companies now view the potential integration of ESG 
disclosure into mandatory public filings as a politicization of the 
SEC’s mission and ESG issues themselves as largely “social” or 
                                                                                                     
a proposal asking the company to prepare a plan to “reach net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2030”)).  
 82. EOG Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2018/trilliummiller022 
618-14a8.pdf. The proposal requested that EOG “adopt company-wide, 
quantitative, timebound targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and issue 
a report discussing its plans and progress towards achieving these targets.” Id.  
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“political,” rather than potentially “economic” or “material.” The 
Business Roundtable, a staunch opponent of any new federal 
reporting requirements, is opposed to ESG-related shareholder 
activism itself on these grounds, arguing that “[s]hareholders 
should not use their investments in U.S. public companies for 
purposes that are not in keeping with the purposes of for-profit 
public enterprises, including but not limited to the advancement of 
personal or social agendas unrelated and/or immaterial to the 
company’s business strategy.”83 
Despite the evidence that the vast majority of institutional 
investors want better ESG disclosure, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s 2017 position paper on corporate disclosure reform 
also questions the value of ESG information and even the 
rationality of investors who seek to use it. It states: “[a]n investor 
that bases its voting and investment decisions on promoting social 
or political goals is not a ‘reasonable’ investor when it comes to 
what materiality means under the federal securities laws.”84 And 
in 2016, ExxonMobil explained its own resistance to ESG 
shareholder proposals in similar terms: “[t]he concept of 
‘reasonable investor’ should govern the SEC’s consideration of 
disclosure requirements, which necessarily should exclude 
disclosures promoted by narrowly-focused special interest groups. 
The SEC should avoid promoting political, social, and public policy 
objectives, or attempting to drive related corporate behavior 
advocated by special interest groups.”85 
Comments from business organizations, issuers, and the legal 
community to the SEC on the wisdom of revising the federal 
disclosure regime to require more specific ESG disclosures have 
adopted a more strident tone. For example, the National Mining 
Association, which led a successful legal battle against conflict 
mineral disclosure rules, argues that:  
                                                                                                     
 83. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/principles-of-corporate-goverance-2016.pdf.  
 84. Essential Information: Modernizing Our Corporate Disclosure System, 
CTR. CAP. MKT. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., (2017), at 1, 8, 
https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/U.S.-
ChamberEssential-Information_Materiality-Report-W_FINAL-1.pdf.  
 85. David S. Rosenthal, ExxonMobil Corp., Comment Letter Concept 
Release on Bus. and Fin. Disclosure Required on Regulation S-K (Aug. 9. 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s-7-06-16/s70616-355.pdf.  
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Activists . . . are now . . . under the guise of transparency 
and good governance, seeking to have the Commission 
adopt reporting requirements that exceed traditional 
reporting contours. The net result is the politicization of 
the Commission to achieve a social or political goal that 
has been outside their grasp by traditional 
means . . . advancing a special interest focus.86  
The Maryland Bar Association’s comments to the SEC on the 
question of ESG disclosure reform were even more strongly 
worded: “[a]s securities lawyers, this perversion of the federal 
securities laws truly offends us. We urge the Commission not to 
make this situation worse.”87  
As these remarks suggest, there is sustained opposition to 
non-financial reporting reform because it is seen as an attempt to 
achieve “social” or “political” objectives. While the implication is 
that such efforts are “impermissible,” the federal proxy rules were 
in fact intended to advance the public interest88 and the anti-fraud 
and investor protection goals of the federal securities laws are 
premised on the power of disclosure to prevent harmful corporate 
practices that would be difficult to eradicate otherwise. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that opposition by companies, trade 
associations, and members of the corporate and securities bars to 
potential ESG disclosure reform is being fueled in part by the 
spillover effects of shareholder activism, and in particular, by how 
the SEC has defined the ordinary business exception. 
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IV. Reframing the Ordinary Business Exception 
Since 1976, shareholders’ ability to raise “significant” issues 
about corporate activities has expanded the space for the use of 
shareholder proposals and engagement with corporate 
management, changing corporate norms, shining light on 
troubling corporate practices, and focusing corporations on what 
matters to investors. Indeed, shareholder proposals have already 
raised the profile of ESG issues for companies and among more 
mainstream investors. But as the materiality of ESG factors 
becomes more widely recognized, it is essential that the SEC’s 
implementation of the proxy rules—the mechanisms of investor 
self-help—do not impede more efficient ESG disclosure reform 
through direct rule-making. 
This Article does not argue for the elimination of the ordinary 
business exception, nor does it advocate fundamental changes to 
the shareholder proxy rules. Of course, future revisions to the rules 
governing the informational content of proxy statements could 
improve investor access to decision-useful, non-financial 
information. But this Article’s key concern is not with the text of 
Rule 14a-8 itself. Instead, its focus is the framing effects and 
communicative impact of the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary 
business exception. 
The basic proposal here is therefore quite simple—that the 
SEC carefully consider the language it uses to define “substantial” 
matters so that it acknowledges the potential economic 
significance or materiality of ESG issues in no-action letters, 
future staff guidance, policy statements, and interpretations. By 
acknowledging the economic significance of non-financial issues, 
the SEC can weaken the false perception that non-financial 
matters are not material to investors. Such a shift would also 
prevent the incongruity of proponents defending material ESG 
issues from exclusion on ordinary business grounds by asserting 
their social and political, rather than economic, importance.  
As it happens, implementing this modest proposal would 
require only that the SEC revive its use of the language of the 1976 
Release, which in fact identified matters “beyond the realm of an 
issuer’s ordinary business operations” as those with “significant 
1256 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231 (2019) 
policy, economic or other implications.”89 In the 1976 Release, the 
SEC also clearly recognized that many shareholder concerns might 
be “significant” for both economic and public policy reasons.90 
Indeed, the SEC made its case for allowing some “ordinary 
business” proposals to reach a shareholder vote by citing an 
example that raised both economic and public policy (i.e. safety) 
considerations: the decision of whether to construct a nuclear 
power plant.91 In keeping with its original formulation, the SEC 
should clarify that its standard allows companies to exclude 
proposals only if they do not raise “significant policy or economic” 
issues, instead of describing the exception as one for proposals 
“that raise significant social policy issues.”92  
This is not to say that all ESG proposals raise material 
economic concerns, nor does this Article anticipate that the 
adoption of ESG-related disclosure reforms by the SEC would 
eliminate the need for ESG shareholder proposals, even those 
concerning information disclosure. Such proposals will still be 
essential, helping investors to raise contested topics and helping 
companies gauge investor interest in issues that may not be 
material, or may not ultimately merit a corporate or agency 
response.93 Many of these topics may be areas of emerging risk for 
companies, while others may never become economically material. 
This is often true, for example, where investors raise concerns 
about corporate impacts on remote or diffuse stakeholders, such as 
victims of human rights abuses, or environmental exploitation. In 
these cases, shareholder activism remains an essential vehicle for 
communicating investors’ views, raising the profile of issues they 
care about, and leveraging companies’ reputational interests to 
spur changes in how companies do business, perhaps more 
powerfully than could be achieved via regulation. Still, reframing 
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how investors, companies, and the SEC’s own staff articulate and 
approach the ordinary business exception could change how 
corporate boards and their advisors understand ESG materiality 
and the growing demands of investors for ESG transparency.  
V. Conclusion 
Shareholder activism has already pushed many changes in 
corporate practice, ranging from corporate governance issues like 
proxy access, to environmental and social concerns, such as climate 
change mitigation, diversity, and sustainability reporting, all of 
which have potentially significant financial implications.94 
Shareholder activism has also begun to shift corporate norms 
around ESG materiality, and many proposals seek some form of 
information disclosure from corporate boards. However, 
shareholder activism cannot substitute for disclosure reform, 
which is a more efficient way to reduce ESG information gaps and 
standardize how this information reaches investors. 
This Article therefore argues that the SEC should reframe 
how it defines “significant” to acknowledge the potential economic 
significance of non-financial matters that may be the subject of a 
shareholder proposal or no-action request. As we have seen, this 
interpretive stance is in fact faithful to the SEC’s early 
articulations of the ordinary business exception. By acknowledging 
the economic relevance of ESG issues, the SEC can reduce issuer 
misperceptions that investor attention to sustainability or ESG 
issues flows only from a political or social agenda. Simply by 
changing its rhetoric, the SEC could reaffirm Congress’ intent to 
create a broad forum for shareholder voice, and at the same time 
remove a subtle, but powerful ideological barrier to future 
disclosure reforms. 
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